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Abstract
We consider an oligopolistic industry including leveraged rms and
unleveraged ones where rms are engaged in a sequential decision-making
process. At the rst stage of the game, a rm and her bank, consider-
ing the demand uncertainty and the distribution probability of the shock,
evaluate a bankruptcy risk and, at the second stage, rms are engaged
in a Cournot competition. We characterize subgame perfect equilibria
and we analyze the impact on these equilibria of the proportion of debt
nanced rms in the industry. By introducing an additionnal upstream
stage to the game, we then examine how debt nancing impacts on incen-
tives to merge with competitors. We demonstrate that a merger involving
leveraged rms increases the bankruptcy probability of the merging rms
while a similar merger concerning unleveraged rms or between the two
categories of rms leads to a decrease in the bankruptcy probability of
leveraged rms. Moreover, the minimum number of rms that must be
engaged in the coalition in order to cause a protable merger, is lower in
comparison with Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983). The welfare losses
associated to anticompetitive e¤ects of mergers are lower when the coali-
tion gathers unleveraged rms rather than leveraged ones. Our model pre-
dicts that in evaluating proposed mergers Competition Authorities should
take into account the nancial structure of both merging rms and out-
siders. Moreover the model justies the failing rm argument when an
unleveraged rm takes over a leveraged one.
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1 Introduction
From the middle of 1980s, a growing attention has been given to the interac-
tions between a rms nancial structure and product market decisions1 . Under
Cournot-type quantity competition a rm is all the more aggressive towards
its competitor than she is indebted (see for instance Brander and Lewis, 1986;
Glazer 1994, Showalter, 1995). This result refers to the commitment value of
the debt to subsequent output strategies and may be explained in the following
way: because shareholders benet from the limited liability when they run a
leveraged rm2 , they choose a level of production without taking into account
potential losses realized in case of default. Consequently, raising debt induces
rms to pursue more aggressive output strategies because it increases prots in
solvency states. A risky debt contract favors the conduct of aggressive product
market strategies and intensies the degree of competition. In such a context,
the Modigliani-Miller neutrality result does not hold. The use of strategic debt
has been studied under price or quantity competition, in the presence of demand
or cost uncertainty: Showalter (1995) shows that, under price competition, rms
enhance their position in the product market when a random shock a¤ects de-
mand but when costs are random rms may choose not use any strategic debt.
A key feature of the literature on strategic debt is that the connection be-
tween a rms nancial structure and its behaviour in the product market is
established in a duopoly setting. As a consequence, the strategic value of the
debt is not examined in a more general oligopoly context where competing rms
may merge so that the number of rms may vary. The impact of the strategic
use of the debt on the rms aggressiveness is not recognized as an incentive
to merge in order to decrease the intensity of competition. When non coopera-
tive rms promote aggressive strategies it makes way for horizontal mergers in
order to attenuate the product market competition. Actually and at the rm
level, the benet from a decrease in the intensity of competition by using an
horizontal merger is connected with the degree of competition which prevails
before the merger. The benets associated with the anti-competitive e¤ects of
mergers are a priori all the more important as rms before the merger were
engaged in an aggressive stance. Consequently, when we take into consideration
the pro-competitive e¤ect of the debt, the nancial structure of rms becomes
a key determinant in the private protability of horizontal mergers.
In this paper, we depart from the literature in Industrial Organization de-
voted to the strategic a¤ect of nancial decisions by generalizing the analysis of
Brander and Lewis (1986) to an oligopolistic industry including leveraged rms
and unleveraged ones and by considering the incentive to merge with competi-
tors when some rms bear a bankruptcy risk. We want to capture the unilateral
e¤ects of mergers when rms nance their production with issuing debt. Our
objective is to examine to what extend the private protability and welfare con-
1For a survey of the literature on the relation between corporate nance and product
market competition see for instance Tirole (2006, Ch. 7) or Maksimovic (1999).
2For nance to play a role in product market competition, we need to consider that share-
holders control the rm strategy.
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sequences of mergers are modied when some competitors bear a bankruptcy
risk. We also evaluate the level of the risk of failure in a context where rms
may be engaged in horizontal mergers.
Nevertheless, the literature dealing with the issue of anticompetitive e¤ects
of horizontal mergers does not highlight the impact of nancial structure on
the individual production decisions. In a Cournot oligopoly setting with sym-
metric non indebted rms, if we assume that mergers do not generate e¢ ciency
gains, it is well known that most of horizontal mergers are unprotable3 unless
a large proportion of rival rms are engaged in the merger: the private incen-
tive to merge appears only if at least 80% of rms are merging (Salant, Switzer
and Reynolds, 1983). This "merger paradox" (minimum market share that the
merging parties require in order to merge protably) is traditionally relaxed by
adopting a Bertrand competition with di¤erentiated products (Deneckere and
Davidson, 1985), by assuming rms merging creates a leader (Daughety, 1990
or Levin, 1990) or by recognizing increasing marginal costs (Perry and Porter,
1985). An increase in the protability of mergers also appears when two stage
games are considered and in particular in models where the managerial contract
acts as a commitment variable. When the production decisions are delegated
to managers, the product market competition is exacerbated (Fershtman and
Judd, 1987 or Sklivas, 1987) and as result the protability of horizontal merg-
ers increases (Ziss, 2001, Gonzales-Maestre and Lopez-Cunat, 2001, Krakel and
Sliwka, 2006). As far as we know, the question of the impact of the indebted-
ness in a game with horizontal mergers has been addressed in only two articles.
Kanatas and Qi (2004) focuses on the impact of outstanding debt in the nan-
cial structure of a high cost rm to motivate takeovers by a healthy and low
cost competitor. They exhibit conditions under which a leveraged rm does not
choose to exit the market and motivates the healthy rm to acquire it. Never-
theless, we largely di¤er from their analysis since they assume no bankruptcy
risk and since they consider that the debt has no strategic role on product mar-
ket decisions (the rm output is independent of the level of the debt, the key role
of limited liability status on production strategies is not introduced). Socorro
(2007) considers a Cournot oligopoly with demand uncertainty and shows that
the collusive impact of horizontal merger is mitigated by the nancing mode of
rms : debt nancing implies that merging parties compete more aggressively
due to limited liability. However, contrary to our model, the level of the debt is
exogenously given so that it is not modied by the merger of rms.
Using a two-stage model, we consider production decisions of leveraged rms
that are vulnerable to bankruptcy. We construct a model of Cournot competi-
tion where rms produce a homogeneous output and sell it on a market with
uncertainty over demand. We evaluate the expected bankruptcy risk and the
optimal leverage in relation with the number of rms getting into debt. The
debt contract involve an estimate (by the rm and by the bank) of the expected
risk of failure since the rm faces a random demand which is distributed ac-
3Private incentive to merge is highly dependent on the nature of competition. If one consid-
ers a Bertrand oligopoly with di¤erentiated product, mergers are always protable (Deneckere
and Davidson, 1985).
4
cording to a given density function. The choice of the levels of the debt and
of the quantities produced determines the threshold of the realization of the
shock above which the rm is solvent. The distribution function of the shock
is common knowledge which allows to evaluate an expected bankruptcy risk at
the rst stage of the game. Because of limited liability, leveraged rms have
incentives to implement product market strategies which increase returns in
the sole solvent states. Thus, when rms resort to debt, it distorts the rms
value optimization program at the output market stage. Debt nancing induces
shareholders, protected by the limited liability, to promote aggressive produc-
tion strategies. We then examine consequences of horizontal mergers according
to the nancial structure of rms by introducing an additional upstream stage in
the game: initially, rms decide to merge or not with rivals. As a consequence,
the model takes into account the benet of anticompetitive horizontal mergers
when leveraged rms bear a bankruptcy risk . We evaluate the protability of
mergers between leveraged rms and the same protability when the mergers
concern unleveraged rms.
The antitrust policy on the control of concentrations also justify our model.
Indeed, the competition laws for authorizing a merger allow for the level of
bankruptcy risk of rms involved in the merger to weigh against anticompetitive
consequences of the increasing concentration of the industry: the US anti-trust
law contains the failing rm defense which permits to authorize mergers even if
they strengthen a dominant position4 . The loss of competition is not merger-
specic if one of the merging parties is failing5 . The European Commission
develops the concept of a rescue merger: a merger would not be blocked (due
to its e¤ect on competition) if the rm to be acquired would in the near future
be forced out of the market. Consequently, if the rm exits the market because
of bankruptcy, the increase in market concentration (as a consequence of a
reduction in the number of competitors) occurs independently of the horizontal
merger. When the merger constitutes an alternative to the exit of the market
by failure, the anti-trust authorities are more prone to allow the merger.
In the literature, there is a lack of articles dealing with the bankruptcy risk of
rms implied in horizontal mergers : "While the literature on mergers generally
is very large, there are very few papers analyzing the failing rm defence specif-
ically" (Mason et Weeds, 2003, p.4) or "little attention has been paid to failing
rm rules in economic theory despite their policy relevance" (Persson, 2005,
p.177). According to Mason and Weeds (2003), competition authorities should
be accommodating when they implement the failing rm argument insofar as
the exit of the market by merger prior to the e¤ective bankruptcy could give
rise to increasing entry. Conversely, Fedele and Tognoni (2005) with a model of
4 It was rst applied in 1930 when the company International Shoe had acquired its com-
petitor (McElwain) in nancial distress.
5More precisely, the implementation of the failing rm argument rests upon three main
criteria : (i) the failing rm in any event must be forced out of the market, (i.i) there is no
alternative buyer who could provide for a less anti-competitive solution, (i.i.i) the market
share of the acquired (failing) rm or its assets would be taken over by the acquiring rm or
in the absence of merger its assets would exit the market.
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horizontal mergers in a Cournot oligopoly with free entry show that a merger
with a failing rm generates an additional production capacity which allows to
deter the entry of new competitors. Persson (2005) analyzes the welfare conse-
quences of the failing rm defence in a context where assets of the failing rm
are sold. He identies circumstances under which this acquisition rule the failing
rm (no less anti-competitive alternative purchase) may lead to total surplus
losses. These losses occur when smaller and ine¢ cient rms are favored in the
bidding process. We depart from these models by showing that welfare losses in
relation with anti-competitive horizontal mergers are lower when a rm which
eventually may default is acquired by a rm with no bankruptcy risk rather
than by a rm which bears a positive bankruptcy risk.
In this paper, we demonstrate that mergers involving leveraged rms in-
crease the bankruptcy probability of the merging rms while similar mergers
concerning unleveraged rms or between the two categories of rms reduce the
bankruptcy probability of leveraged rms. The welfare losses associated to anti-
competitive e¤ects of mergers are lower when the coalition gathers unleveraged
rms rather than leveraged ones. The model justies the failing rm argument
when an unleveraged rm takes over a leveraged one.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In section 2 the model
of strategic nancial and operating choices is presented. Section 3 discusses
the properties of product market equilibria when the number of rms is given.
Private incentives to merge according to the bankruptcy risk of competitive rms
are examined in section 4. Section 5 summarizes main results of the article and
derives implications for competition policy.
2 A simple model of Cournot competition with
bankruptcy risk
2.1 Hypotheses
We consider n rms that produce an homogeneous product and engage in quan-
tity competition. All rms have the same marginal cost which is normalized to
zero without loss of generality. In the industry, we distinguish two categories of
rms according to their nancial choice. A rst group gathers n1 rms which
raise debt and bankruptcy occurs when the rm cannot fulll its debt payments.
A second group aggregates n2 (= n   n1) rms which only use equity capital
as a nancing mode and consequently have no bankruptcy risk. These two cat-
egories of rms in competition on the product market may reect di¤erences in
attitudes of entrepreneurs towards nancing on equity capital. One could imag-
ine that some rms do not want to nance on equity capital owing to the loss
of control resulting from capital opening to outside shareholders6 . Even though
6This kind of argument concerns the case of family rms for instance.
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debt in nancial structure creates a possibility of incurring a bankruptcy risk,
it allows to keep the control on the running of the rm as well (at least on the
states of the nature where the rm is able to meet its debts) . Conversely, rms
choosing not to borrow money avoid such a transfer of control rights on rms
assets when insolvent states occur. Moreover, in the perspective of the literature
on credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) the lender adjust the level of the
loan to the value of the collateral so that the category of unleveraged rms also
includes rms ruled out of bank nance.
The production level of a leveraged [unleveraged] rm is qi [qj ]. Operating
prots are denoted by Ri [Rj ] and are dependent on individual levels of pro-
duction and on an additive random shock z on market price reecting uncertain
demand on the product market. The random variable z is assumed to be uni-
formly distributed over the interval [ z;+z] with a density function f(z) = 1=2z
.
The inverse demand is given by:
p = a Q+ z
where Q represents the aggregate production.
Since the rm i has to repay its debt from its operating prot, she declares
bankruptcy if its prot falls short its debt payment. There is thus a threshold
value of z, noticed bzi; such that if the realized state of the world is such as z < bzi
the rm is bankrupt and if z  bzi, the rm is solvent and able to reimburse
its debt. Consequently, equity holders are residual claimants only in the good
states of nature (z  bzi)
Di is the level of rms i short term debt (reimbursed on only one production
game) and ri is the interest rate. The level of repayments in the good states
of nature is Bi = (1 + ri)Di resulting in a threshold value bzi dened by the
condition : Ri(qi; qj ; bzi) = Bi.
The cumulative distribution function F denes the bankruptcy probability
F ( bzi) = i with:
i =
R bzi
 z f(z)dz = 1 
R zbzi f(z)dz
The model is a three-stage oligopoly game. Initially (stage 1), shareholders
decide to merge or not taking into account the impact of merging decisions on
bankruptcy risk and production choices. The exact number of competitors is
given at this stage. In stage 2, for the category of rms with positive debt
levels, each rm and her bank agree upon an expected bankruptcy risk7 . This
risk refers to the threshold value bzi that maximizes the ex ante total value
(equity and debt) of the rm . Finally, the rms make production decisions and
the amount of the loan is calibrated to the estimated bankruptcy probability
(stage 3). Shareholders choose an output market strategy that maximizes the
7Nevertheless, the study of mergers can also be done while keeping the original Brander
and Lewis (1986) assumptions, but computation is then much heavier, since the equilibrium
production of a rm is a solution to a second degree equation (see Franck and Le Pape, 2008).
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equity value. All choices are made before the realization of the shock and payo¤s
are received when uncertainty on the demand is resolved. To obtain a subgame
perfect equilibrium, the game is solved backwards.
2.2 Bankruptcy risk valuation and debt/product market
strategies
We want to capture the impact of bankruptcy risk on subsequent product mar-
ket strategies. This risk results from the realization of a demand random shock
which is assumed to be common knowledge. The rm is bankrupt if the realiza-
tion of the shock is below the threshold value (bzi), the bankruptcy probability
is given by the cumulative distribution function F of z. We consider that the
threshold value bzi, corresponding to the state of nature for which operating
prot is just large enough to repay debt obligation, is given when output and
debt decisions take place. In this case, rms are not allowed to change it the
bankruptcy probability before production decisions take place. The model takes
into account the fact that the bankruptcy risk is strategically used in order to
take advantage in the product market8 . Consequently, our approach contrasts
with the standard literature on debt/product market interaction since models in
the vein of Brander and Lewis (1986) recognize the debt obligation as a strategic
device.
Three main economic arguments could be put forward in order to justify the
commitment value of bankruptcy risk.
In the rst place, during the 1990s, the context of disintermediation and of
an increasing competition between banks led to banking strategies to prospect
the fringe of customers endowed with a higher level of risk of failure which caused
a growing proportion of the riskier borrowers in the credit portfolios of banking
institutions. In such a context of the weakening of the nancial stability of
the banking industry, the Basel Committee (2001) on banking supervision has
imposed that the granting of a loan must be contingent to an estimation of the
debtors default risk. Numerous models of the estimate of credit risk can be
quoted: model CreditMetric of JP Morgan, model Credit Risk+ of the Crédit
Suisse and so on. . . Using scoring models, the bank attributes a note to potential
borrowers reecting their expected probability of default and then she decides
conditions on the loan (in particular the interest rate). Moreover, banks are
induced to generalize such practises since those which develop the most accurate
measure and management of credit risk will be imposed to lowest statutory
needs in equity capital (risk-sensitive capital requirements). Consequently, these
aforementioned transformations in the banking landscape justify the sequence
of decisions retained in the model according to which the level of the debt is
dened at the stage 3 and is endogenous to a prior estimation of the default
probability of the borrower (variable determined at the stage 2).
8Analytically, we have: (1 + ri)Di = Bi = Ri(qi; qj ; bzi) = i(qi(bzi; bzj); qj(bzi; bzj); bzi) =
	i(bzi; bzj). This sequence of decisions brings into light a new determinant of the decision to
take risks.
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Secondly, the timing of the game is also coherent with the issuing of bond
debts. Firms resorting to bond issues are quoted by specialized rating agencies
which evaluate the issuers quality on the basis of its bankruptcy risk. The
bonds interest rate is conditional on the issuers insolvency risk.
Thirdly, the literature concerning the relationship between banks and rms
frequently emphasized that taking into account information in risk analysis
increases estimations precision of borrowers quality. Regarding the bank-
borrower relationship, Petersen (2004) puts forward a distinction between hard
and soft information. Hard information is external and can be obtained via
public information (balance sheet data) while soft information is internal via
bank-borrower relationship. Hard information has the properties of veriability
and non manipulability and scoring is a hard informationtreatment method for
credit risk prediction. This method allows to implement risk adjusted pricing
and leads to a decrease in credit rationing (Berger and al., 2002 ; Frame and al.,
2001). Our model is coherent with credit risk management in banks through
credit scoring where it is assumed that the available information is quantitative
and veriable9 . The hard information structure refers to a situation in which
the range of the states of nature must be evaluated and the distribution proba-
bility of each event must be computed (common knowledge in the model). The
model is also consistent with banks internal ratings used to predict default risk
since in such a case the amount of the credit and the lending rate are dependent
on the rms rating.
2.3 Resolution of the game
We consider that the investment Ii with no residual value must be nanced at
least partially by borrowing Di and shareholders provide Ei = Ii Di. In order
to borrow Di shareholders must promise to pay back Bi = (1 + ri)Di
At the production stage, the rm i maximizes the ex ante value of equity,
denoted V NEi and given by:
V NEi =
Z z
bzi

Ri  Bi

f(z)dz   (1 + ri)Ei
In the above expression, the net value to shareholders is discounted at the
interest rate of the loan (ri).
The optimal level of production is given by (see appendix 1 for the demon-
stration):
Q+ qi = a+ i (1)
Where : i = 14z (z + bzi)2
By summing the best response functions for all the rms with positive debt,
we obtain:
9This perception of risk comes from Knight (1921). He distinguishes risk and uncertainty
and considers that a risky situation is measurable by using an objective probability.
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n1Q+ qe = n1a+
n1X
i=1
i
With : qe =
n1P
i=1
qi
If we now look at rm j which has no debt, her production decision (qj)
maximizes the expected value of operating prot E(Rj). The rst-best level of
production qj implies that:
Q+ qj = a (2)
Summing the best response function for all the rms with no debt gives:
n2Q+ qne = n2a
Where: qne =
n2P
j=1
qj
Equations (1) et (2) give individual production levels of the two types i and
j of rms given i (or implicitly given bzi).
At the rst stage, we consider the choice of the optimal threshold state of
nature bzi. Firms select the value of the bankrupt state bzi with the objective of
maximizing the sum of equity value and debt value10 . The combined value of
the rms debt and equity corresponds to the expected cash ow (or total value
of the rm) minus investment cost updated to the given rate d11 , which is the
average rate of return set by the bank on her loan:
Y i =
Z z
 z
Ri(:; z)f(z)dz   (1 + d)Ii
Y i =
hR zbzi Rif(z)dz   R zbzi Bif(z)dzi  (1 + d)Ei
=) Value of the rm to shareholders
when equity capital is discounted at rate d
+
hR bzi
 z R
i(:; z)f(z)dz +
R zbzi Bif(z)dzi  (1 + d)Di
=) Value of the rm to the bank
Di¤erentiating this optimization program and the two aggregated best re-
sponses functions yields a system of equations that we solve to obtain product
market equilibrium (proof see appendix 6.1)
10The bank is assumed to be perfectly informed on the rms characteristics and on the shock
on the demand. We dot not take into account agency problems in the lending relationship.
11The rate d is necessarily lower than ri since at the rate ri the banks prot is always
negative.
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To simplify the exposition, we introduce the following notation:  = nn1 +
n2.
The equilibrium aggregate output produced is:
Q =

1 + 
a
The average price in the industry is given by:
E(p) =
1
1 + 
a
The resulting production level for a rm with a positive debt can be com-
pared with the production of an unleveraged rm:
qi =
n
1 + 
a
qj =
1
1 + 
a
It could be noticed that those equilibrium productions are independent of
the demand volatility (scope of states of nature z )
The resulting optimal level of default risk (i) in the category of leveraged
rms is:
2i =
(n  1)a
(1 + )z
By denition, the bankruptcy probability is given by12 : i = z+bzi2z
From the above expressions, it is straightforward to calculate rms prot.
Since the banks prot is null at rate d, the value of the rm to equity holders
is:
V NEi = Yi
If the rm has debt in its nancial structure, the expected prot to share-
holders can therefore be written as:
E(Ri) =
n
(1 + )2
a2
If the rm chooses not to be indebted, the expected return to shareholders
is:
E(Rj) =
1
(1 + )2
a2
We obtain the interest rate on the loan as a function of the rate of return d
of debt capital (proof can be found in the appendix 6.2):
1 + ri
1 + d
=
n(qi   i)
qi   ni
where: i = 14z (z   bzi)2 .
12The condition i  1 ( or bzi  z ) implies the following constraint on z : z  i .
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3 Equilibrium properties of the model
For given values of n1 et n2, unleveraged rms follow a more conservative strat-
egy, i.e. produce less than leveraged ones. This result is in line with Brander
and Lewis (1986) models which asserts that, in a Cournot duopoly, debt com-
mits rms shareholders to a more aggressive product market behavior (higher
quantity choices). As shown by equation (1), the leveraged rm has an incen-
tive to increase its output since a positive level of debt shifts the best response
function outwards at the competitive stage of the game.
Provided that a the number of competitors (n) is given, when the proportion
of leveraged rms in the industry increases, consumers benet from a higher
level of aggregate production but leveraged rms as well as unleveraged rms
are a¤ected with a lower individual expected prot. Especially if all the rms
in the Cournot oligopoly have a positive debt, the individual operating prot
is given by E(R) = a2n=(1 + n2)2 while in the standard static Cournot game
with no debt we obtain E(R) = a2=(1 + n2) implying a higher expected prot.
This result is commonly called the prisoners dilemma : if rms could behave
cooperatively, they would select only equity capital in their nancial structure.
More generally, we consider the impact of the industrys composition, through
n1 et n2, on the individual production decisions and on the bankruptcy proba-
bility for rms with debt obligation. The main properties of the subgame perfect
equilibrium are summarized in the following proposition (proof: see Appendix
6.3).
Proposition 1 When the number of leveraged rms, n1, increases, the indi-
vidual production of a leveraged rm decreases but the aggregate production of
leveraged rms increases. Moreover, the industry output is higher despite the
decrease of the aggregate production of unleveraged rms. Individual expected
prots of rms decrease irrespective of their nancial structure. When, n  3 ,
the bankruptcy probability is a decreasing function of n1 .
Proposition 2 When the number of unleveraged rms, n2, increases, the indi-
vidual production of an unleveraged rm decreases but the aggregate production
of unleveraged rms increases. Moreover, the industry output is higher despite
the decrease of the aggregate production of leveraged rms. Individual expected
prots of rms decrease irrespective of their nancial structure. The bankruptcy
probability is an increasing function of n2 .
4 An application to horizontal mergers
4.1 Horizontal mergers and market equilibria
An additional upstream stage to the game is introduced: initially, rms decide
whether to merge or not. If a merger occurs between m rms, the resulting
number of competitors in the industry is (n   m   1). The exact number of
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competitors in the industry results from the merger stage and all remaining rms
engage in Cournot competition. All rms have the same constant marginal cost
(for simplicity normalized at zero) and the decision to merge is not motivated
by a decrease in the production cost. Then the game follows as in Section 2.
Using results from Section 3, we note that a merger in the group of leveraged
rms or in the group of unleveraged rms generates, in both cases, anticom-
petitive e¤ects (lower industry output). The comparative static properties of
mergers are described in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 :
(i) A merger concerning rms with a positive debt exhibits higher anticom-
petitive e¤ects,
(i.i) When the merger takes place between two leveraged rms, the individual
production of a leveraged rm increases, the aggregate production of all leveraged
rms decreases while the production of outsiders with no debt increases,
(i.i.i) When the merger takes place between two unleveraged rms, the in-
dividual production of an unleveraged rm increases, the aggregate production
of all unleveraged rms decreases while the production of outsiders with debt
increases.
The point (i) of the proposition results from the fact that Q is an increasing
function of  = (n1 + n2)n1 + n2. When n1 or n2 falls in the same amount, the
impact on  is higher when the drop concerns n1 rather than n2 , i.e. when
merging rms have debt in their nancial structure. The two others points of
the proposition arise from propositions stated in Section 3.
Accounting for the nancial structure of rms engaging in a merger does
not lead to reconsider the existence of anticompetitive e¤ects but it a¤ects their
extent.
Concerning the impact of the merger on bankruptcy probability, we can state
:
Proposition 4 A merger between rms with a positive debt leads to an increase
in the bankruptcy probability while a merger between rms with no debt involves
a decrease in the bankruptcy probability. Finally, a merger between one leveraged
rm and one or several unleveraged rms leads to a decrease in the bankruptcy
probability of the merging entity.
Horizontal mergers implying rms with positive debt in their nancial struc-
ture increase the nancial vulnerability of the new entity issued from the merger.
Horizontal mergers involving unleveraged rms generate a positive externality
for leveraged outsiders. In addition, the merger decreases the nancial vulner-
ability when it includes a rm with no debt. This result provides an additional
justication to the failing rm argument we nd in most antitrust jurisdictions
according to which one should facilitate horizontal mergers implying a rm in
nancial distress. Our model shows that such a merger constitutes an e¢ cient
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alternative to the exit from the market through bankruptcy. Consequently, an-
titrust authorities should be accommodating towards horizontal mergers when
rms involved by the mergers are characterized by di¤erent risks of failure.
4.2 Private incentives to merge
We consider private incentives to merge in an oligopoly setting where rms
selecting no-debt nancing compete with rms supporting debt obligations and
consequently are endowed with a positive bankruptcy risk.
We rst assume a symmetric oligopoly in order to compare incentives to
merge in a context where all the competing rms either choose holding debt or
either decide upon not to borrow money. In such a context, we examine to what
extent the incentive to merge for anticompetitive considerations is motivated by
the bankruptcy risk at the industry level.
In the case where all competing rms issue debt, individual levels of pro-
duction and prot are given by (for simplication purpose, we use the notation:
E(R) = ):
(n) =
na2
(1 + n2)
2
In the benchmark case where rms select no debt in their nancial structure,
we have:
(n) =
a2
(1 + n)
2
The private incentive to merge is given by the comparison between pre-
merger and post-merger prots. If we assume a merged entity composed of m
rms, the incentive to merge results from the condition13 :
(n;m) = (n m+ 1) m(n) > 0
Salant et al. (1983) have shown that a protable merger requires the merging
partiesmarket share to be at least 80 percent. This result from the condition:
m (n m+ 2)2 < (1 + n)2
If we now turn to the case where rms select debt nancing, the private
incentive to merge is given by:
mn

1 + (n m+ 1)2
2
< (n m+ 1)  1 + n22
Consequently, the interaction between nancial structure and output market
equilibrium creates an additional motive for anticompetitive horizontal mergers
(cf. Fig.1 ):
13Obviously, since the number of competitors is reduced, horizontal mergers for anticom-
petive motives benet more to each outsider. This e¤ect refers to the merger paradox implying
that all protable mergers cannot be reached since rms may prefer not to be involved in the
merger (see models of endogeneous mergers, for instance Kamien and Zang, 1990; Krakel and
Sliwka, 2006).
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Fig.1 : Private incentive to merge under debt and no debt regimes
This gure shows that if rms are debt-nanced, the minimum market share
required for protable mergers is reduced. This result comes from the fact that
in a Cournot oligopoly debt intensies the competition and lowers expected
prots. For a given number of rms, the erosion of prots due to the high
output and low price motivates horizontal concentration in order to increase
the market power of rms and their prots. The benet from anticompetitive
e¤ect of mergers is all the more important as the intensity of competition in the
pre-merger context was intense.
We now consider private incentives to merge when rms issuing debt compete
with equity nanced rms. The objective here is to identify in what extend
the incentive to merge is modied according to the nancial structure of rms
engaged in the merger.
The individual level of prot in the category of rms who are equity nanced
is given by:
j(n1; n2) =
1
(1 + (n1 + n2)n1 + n2)
2 a
2
The private incentive to merge when m rms with no debt are engaged in
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the coalition is:
j(n1; n2;m) = 
j(n1; n2  m+ 1) mj(n1; n2) > 0
Or:
(1 + (n1 + n2)n1 + n2)
2
> m (1 + (n1 + n2  m+ 1)n1 + n2  m+ 1)2
The individual level of prot of a rm i with debt nancing is:
i(n1; n2) =
n1 + n2
(1 + (n1 + n2)n1 + n2)
2 a
2
The private incentive to merge when m rms with positive debt are engaged
in the coalition is:
i(n1; n2;m) = 
i(n1  m+ 1; n2) mi(n1; n2) > 0
Or:
(n1  m+ 1 + n2) (1 + (n1 + n2)n1 + n2)2 >
m (n1 + n2) (1 + (n1  m+ 1 + n2) (n1  m+ 1) + n2)2
We can observe that form = 2: i(n1; n2; 2) = i(n1; n2 1) i(n1; n2) 
j(n1; n2) > 0:
Proposition 5 A merger implying one rm of each category is always protable
independently of the number of rms in the industry
The demonstration of this result is given in appendix 6.5
We now examine the private incentive to merge according to the nancial
structure of rms engaged in the coalition.
The condition on the minimum market share that the merging parties require
in order to merge protably in the category of rms with no debt is given by
the ratio (m=n) so that14 j(1; n2;m) = 0. Of course, the private incentive
to merge for leveraged rms results from the sign of: i(n1; 1;m)
14 In each case, we consider the most favorable context for a protable merger, ie n1 = 1
and n2 = 1 respectively.
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Mergers in the category of
unleveraged rms (n1 = 1)
n2 = 2 (m=n)min = 67%
n2 = 3 (m=n)min = 75%
n2 = 4 (m=n)min = 80%
n2 = 5 (m=n)min = 83%
n2 = 6 (m=n)min = 71%
Table 1a: Minimum threshold
of unleveraged participants
for protable mergers
Mergers in the category of
leveraged rms (n2 = 1)
n1 = 2 (m=n)min = 67%
n1 = 3 (m=n)min = 50%
n1 = 4 (m=n)min = 60%
n1 = 5 (m=n)min = 50%
n1 = 6 (m=n)min = 57%
Table 1b: Minimum threshold
of leveraged participants
for protable mergers
The ratio (m=n)min is reduced compared to Salant, Switzer and Reynolds
(1983). When outsiders have a positive debt, the minimum threshold of un-
leveraged participants for protable mergers can be lower than 80%. In SSR
model, when there is 3 or 4 competitors in the industry, mergers are never prof-
itable unless they lead to monopolization of the market. Table 1b shows that
when insiders have debt in their nancial structure, the incentive to merge is
higher compared to the case where merging parties have no debt. In a Cournot
oligopoly where leveraged rms compete with unleveraged ones, the lowest per-
centage of the participants (m=n) for the merger to be protable is always
inferior when the insiders are debt-nanced.
4.3 Welfare and implications for competition policy
Social welfare is given by the following expression:
W = (a Q)Q+ Q
2
2
=
a2   (a Q)2
2
Since Q  a , W is an increasing function of Q. Horizontal mergers results
in a reduction in the number of rms and are never welfare improving since we
assume no e¢ ciency gains. We compare reductions in production (and conse-
quently welfare losses) due to a merger involving two rms. We distinguish a
merger with two leveraged insiders from a merger between a leveraged rm and
an unleveraged ones.
a Q(n1; n2) = a
1 + (n1; n2)
With:
(n1   1; n2) < (n1; n2   1) < (n1; n2)
Then:
a Q(n1   1; n2) > a Q(n1; n2   1) > a Q(n1; n2)
17
Or:
W (n1; n2) > W (n1; n2   1) > W (n1   1; n2)
Social welfare losses are lower in the situation where the merger involves
two rms with di¤erentiated nancial structures. The practical implication of
this theoretical result is that antitrust authorities should not always prohibit
mergers when merging rms face distinct bankruptcy risks. The failing rm
argument constitutes an illustration of this view.
5 Concluding remarks
Financial structure of competitors engaged in a merger impacts on private incen-
tives to merge, nancial vulnerability of rms and social welfare. In a symmetric
Cournot oligopoly, when rms have debt in their nancial structure and conse-
quently bear a positive bankruptcy risk, the minimum number of insiders for the
merger to be protable is lower than the corresponding number in the seminal
model of Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983). In particular, a merger between
a leveraged rm and an unleveraged rm is always protable. An additional
motive to horizontal mergers without e¢ ciency gains appears: anticompetitive
mergers are all the more protable as shareholders, protected by limited lia-
bility, favors aggressive strategies towards competitors in the pre-merger game.
The model also implies that one should expect that the probability to merge
with competitors is higher in industries where the rms use debt in their nan-
cial structure. Concerning antitrust policy, our approach suggests that welfare
losses in relation with anti-competitive horizontal mergers are lower when a
rm which eventually may default is acquired by a rm with no bankruptcy
risk rather than by a rm which bears a positive bankruptcy risk. Competition
authorities, in assessing mergers involving failing rms, should take this out-
come. Welfare losses in relation with a decrease in the number of competitors
are higher when all insiders are debt-nanced. As a consequence, such mergers
create a wider discrepancy between private incentive and social desirability.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Best response function
Firm i maximizes the ex ante value of equity (V NEi):
V NEi =
Z z
bzi

Ri  Bi

f(z)dz   (1 + ri)Ei
V NEi =
Z z
bzi

Ri  Bi

f(z)dz   (1 + ri)Ii +Bi
In the above expression, the net value to shareholders is discounted at the
interest rate of the loan (ri).
The expected gross prot is denoted Ri and dened by:
Ri = E(p)qi
For analytical tractability we consider a linear demand, so we have:
Ri = Ri + zqi
Ri  Bi = Ri(qi; qj ; z) Ri(qi; qj ; bzi) = (z   bzi)qi
V NEi =
1
4z
(z   bzi)2 qi + Ri + bziqi   (1 + ri)Ii
The shareholders decide on the optimal level of production to maximize the
equity value, given the default risk on the loan: Max
qi
V NEi
Maximization of the above expression yields rst order condition15 :
Rmi =  

1
4z
(z   bzi)2 + bzi =   1
4z
(z + bzi)2
Where : Rmi = @
Ri
@qi
= a Q  qi .
Setting : i = 14z (z + bzi)2 , the optimality condition can be rewritten:
Rmi =  i ,
Or equivalently: Q+ qi = a+ i
15The investment is assumed to be exogeneously given and independent of the production.
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6.2 Equilibrium productions
We di¤erentiate optimality conditions of the stage 3 considering a marginal
variation in i, di , others k being constant:
-for a leveraged rm, we have Q+ qi = a+ i implying dQ+ dqi = di.
If we aggregate : n1Q+ qe = n1a+
n1P
i=1
i and n1dQ+ dqe = di ,
Or: dQ+ dqi = n1dQ+ dqe
-for an unleveraged rm, we have Q+ qj = a ,
If we aggregate : n2Q+ qne = n2a and n2dQ+ dqne = 0
Or: dqne =  n2dQ.
We then di¤erentiate the objective function at the stage 2:
(a Q)dqi   qidQ = 0 ,
(a Q)dqi = qidQ .
We consider the equation dQ+ dqi = n1dQ+ dqe , we have dQ = dqe+ dqne
, and therefore
dqi = (n1   1)dQ+ dqe = (n1   1)dQ+ dQ  dqne
dqi = n1dQ+ n2dQ = (n1 + n2)dQ
Consequently
qidQ = (a Q)(n1 + n2)dQ
qi = (a Q)(n1 + n2)
Or : n1qi = n1(a Q)(n1 + n2) = qe
Since: qne = n2(a Q),
By adding qe and qne we obtain:
Q = n1(a Q)(n1 + n2) + n2(a Q) ,
Therefore, we get the total industry output:
Q =

1 + 
a
With  = n1(n1 + n2) + n2 = n1n+ n2 .
6.3 Loan interest rate
The banks prot, discounted at rate d, is :
b =
R bzi
 z R
if(z)dz +
R zbzi Bif(z)dz   (1 + d)Di = 0
or
b =
R bzi
 z R
if(z)dz +
R zbzi(Ri + bziqi)f(z)dz   (1 + d)Di = 0
which, after some manipulations gives
Ri   iqi = (1 + d)Di = iBi
where i =
(z bzi)2
4z , i =
1+d
1+ri
.
As a consequence,
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i =
Ri   iqi
Ri + bziqi
Since
i =
(z + bzi)2
4z
= i + bzi
one expression for i is
i =
E(p)  i
E(p) + i   i
At equilibrium, E(p) = 11+a =
qi
n , and E(p) + i = qi ,
so that nally,
1
i
=
1 + ri
1 + d
=
n(qi   i)
qi   ni
6.4 Incidence of n1 and n2 upon productions and the prob-
ability of failure
6.4.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Given the expression Q = 1+a, it is straightforward that Q is an increasing
function of  and consequently of n1. Considering equation (2) it results that
when n1 increases, qj and qne decreases, and as a consequence qe increases.
If we now turn to qi, we have: qi = n1+a
It is easier to consider the expression a=qi
a
qi
=
1 + 
N
=
1 + n2
n1 + n2
+ n1 (A1)
It can be easily verify that d( aqi )=dn1 = 1  1+n2(n1+n2)2  0
We have that qi is decreasing function of n1.
The probability of failure is increasing with i, and note that:
i = q   (a Q) = n  1
1 + 
a
We then have:
i =
1
i
=
nn1 + n2 + 1
n  1 = n1 +
n+ 1
n  1 (A2)
By computing the derivative with respect to n1, we obtain:
di
dn1
= 1  2
(n  1)2
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We have: didn1 > 0 if n  3 .
Under this condition on the number of rms, i (or equivalently the proba-
bility of failure) decreases with n1.
6.4.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Recall that Q is increasing with . Since,  increases with n2, it is obvious that
when n2 increases, Q increases.
If we now consider qi, equation (A1) implies that the expression a=qi in-
creases with n2.
As a consequence, when n2 increases, qi decreases and also qe. It then results
that qne increases with n2. From the equation (2), one can see that when n2
increases qj decreases.
Equation (A2) exhibits that i decreases with n and so with n2. Conse-
quently, i increases with the number n2.
6.5 Protable two-rms mergers
We have to show that:
i(n1; n2   1) = i(n1; n2   1) i(n1; n2) j(n1; n2) > 0
With:
i(n1; n2) =
n1 + n2
(1 + (n1 + n2)n1 + n2)
2 a
2
And:
j(n1; n2) =
1
(1 + (n1 + n2)n1 + n2)
2 a
2
The inequality is then :
n1 + n2   1
(1 + (n1 + n2   1)n1 + n2   1)2
a2 >
n1 + n2 + 1
(1 + (n1 + n2)n1 + n2)
2 a
2
Since:  = n1(n1 + n2) + n2 = n1n+ n2, we have:
n1 + n2   1
(1 +   n1   1)2
>
n1 + n2 + 1
(1 + )
2
1 + 
1 +   n1   1
2
>
n1 + n2 + 1
n1 + n2   1
1  n1 + 1
1 + 
2
<
N   1
N + 1
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We introduce the following notation:
x =
n1 + 1
1 + 
=
n1 + 1
1 +N + (N   1)n1
For a given value of N , x is an increasing function of n1 :
dx
dn1
=
2
(1 +N + (N   1)n1)2
> 0
Consequently, the minimum value for x is obtained when n1 = 1. This value
is: xmin = 1=N
(1  xmin)2 =

N   1
N
2
Obviously:
 
N 1
N
2
< N 1N+1
Then: 
1  n1 + 1
1 + 
2
<
N   1
N + 1
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